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Abstract 
 
Social norms are a widely used concept for explaining human behavior, but there are few 
studies exploring how we cognitively utilize them. We incorporate here an evolutionary 
approach to studying social norms, predicting that if norms have been critical to biological 
fitness, then individuals should have adaptive mechanisms to conform to, and avoid 
violating, norms. A cognitive bias toward norms is one specific means by which individuals 
could achieve this. To test this, we assessed whether individuals have greater recall for 
normative information than non-normative information. Three experiments were performed 
in which participants read a text and were then tested on their recall of behavioral content. 
The data suggest that individuals have superior recall for normative social information, and 
performance is not related to rated importance. We discuss how such a cognitive bias may 
ontogenetically develop and identify possible hypotheses that distinguish between 
alternative explanatory accounts for social norms. 
 
Keywords: social norms, social influence, recall bias, conformism, cooperation 
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An evolved cognitive bias for social norms 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The social life of humans is guided by social norms. These cultural rules shape and 
structure our daily behaviors, guiding much of what we do and do not do by prescribing 
what behavior is acceptable (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Yet despite their widespread use in 
psychological theories (e.g., Hechter & Opp, 2001), the functions of normative behavior are 
not empirically well established from either an evolutionary or proximate perspective and 
have tended to be taken for granted as a social phenomenon. Of course, some social 
patterns of behavior that are labeled as social norms may not be learned behaviors at all 
(e.g., incest avoidance), but a vast array of social patterns of behavior are self-evidently 
learned. 
 
There are a number of theoretical models that may account for the functions of 
social norms that we can outline briefly here. One simple account of social norms is that 
they are the result of social learning (Bandura, 1977), with some behaviors becoming 
particularly prevalent in a population, perhaps due to, in some sense, a “tipping point” 
effect (Gladwell, 2000), in which their distributions are curtailed only by group boundaries. 
A slightly varied version of this model views some norms as a result of a corresponding 
meme (Dawkins, 1976). Alternatively, “normative conformity” (Henrich, 2004) may have 
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an ancient phylogenetic history; many gregarious animal species demonstrate a simple 
version of conforming behavior, “following the herd” to avoid exposure to predators 
(Hamilton, 1971). However, people’s responses to social norms, violations of norms, and 
changes in norms suggest that norms are not due solely to incidental group boundaries or 
selfish herds, although these may play a role. 
 
A second more sophisticated account of norms suggests that they may result from 
an evolved strategy to avoid the costs of individual learning: If successful behaviors tend to 
become widespread, then adopting widespread behaviors should tend to result in the 
acquisition of beneficial behaviors (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Furthermore, Richerson and 
Boyd (2005) have argued that a conformism bias can reduce the chances of individuals 
making errors when sampling for prevalent beneficial behaviors. Henrich and Boyd (1998) 
have shown that a conformity bias can evolve if humans existed in an environment that 
fluctuated (though not too rapidly), provided inference by individuals from environmental 
cues is neither too accurate nor too error-prone. In fact, they show that a conformity bias is 
likely to evolve even when reliance on social learning is limited, and that a conformity bias 
can enhance reliance on social learning. Empirically, it has been shown that individuals 
increasingly rely on a conformist tendency as task importance increases (Baron, Vandello, 
& Brunsman, 1996). 
 
A third account is that certain behaviors may achieve some form of symbolic status 
for a group, such that adopting the behavior is required to be considered part of the ingroup 
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(Boyd & Richerson, 1987; e.g., Fitch, 2000). The ingroup mechanism is powerful in 
humans, easily elicited, and once a behavior is seen as a badge for the group, adopting it 
would be critical to full group membership. Prapavessis and Carron (1997) have shown that 
an increased sense of rapport and trust can be facilitated from perceptible similarity due to 
norms. Public signals could enhance and stabilize this effect, either by requiring group 
members to invest resources of time and/or energy in displaying membership cues (e.g., 
religious rituals, Sosis, 2003), or at least publicly advertise group allegiance, making 
switching membership costly by virtue of having to convince the new group that the 
individual’s allegiance is substantial. Related, Fessler (2004) has argued that the behavioral 
correlates of shame indicate an individual’s awareness of violating a norm, signaling both 
awareness and contrition. A fourth possible cause of social norms, group coordination and 
cohesiveness, driven by intergroup competition for resources and direct conflict (Bugental, 
2000), would benefit from tangible markers showing group allegiance. Such coordination 
may be the result of Nash-equilibrium type situations, where one particular goal or behavior 
requires group coordination to attain and represents a stable optimal choice for the group as 
a whole. 
 
Finally, norms may be the product of cooperative group behavior, perhaps even 
being elevated to moral norms or rules (Boehm, 1999; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson, 
2002). Wilson and Kniffin (1999) have shown that a conformity bias can evolve due to 
between-group selection while Richerson and Boyd (2005) have argued that a conformity 
bias can serve as a means at the cultural level to filter errors that individuals make when 
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acquiring prevalent behaviors. Conformism plays an important theoretical role in the 
evolution and maintenance of cultural evolution, and of cooperative behaviors so derived 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005). In such cases, nonconformity constitutes a form of free-riding 
and requires a deterrent. Punishment of norm violators appears to be a near-universal trait 
of humans (Brown, 1991). Violations of norms often carry negative consequences ranging 
from social disapproval and gossip (Acheson, 1988; Ellickson, 1991; Kniffin & Wilson, 
2005) to exclusion and expulsion from groups (Boehm, 1999; Brown, 1991), even 
extending to murder on occasions (Boehm, 1993, 1999; Brown, 1991). Studies such as 
those by Wilson and O’Gorman (2003), O’Gorman, Wilson, and Miller (2005), and Price, 
Tooby and Cosmides (2002) provide support for the view that humans are predisposed to 
react negatively to norm violations, while laboratory experiments show that individuals 
willingly incur costs to punish, even when there are no further opportunities to interact with 
the same individuals (Fehr & Gachter, 2002). 
 
Centrally, each of these accounts of norms, with the exception of the “viral” and 
selfish herd accounts, lead to the prediction of a conformity bias in human cognition 
facilitating enhanced recall of normative information. Of course, behavioral conformity is a 
well-established finding in social behavior, demonstrated to be quite powerful when 
activated (e.g., Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1936). However, a cognitive bias that increases access 
to knowledge of normative behaviors following observation of such behaviors is only 
required if there is some inherent value in the normative behaviors. That is, norms due to 
viral processes should not obviously produce a cognitive bias for normative behavior, 
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whereas a selfish herd conformity is beneficial only while a norm is being manifested 
behaviorally. Only the gene-culture, membership and cooperative norms models 
consistently predict a cognitive bias for recall of normative information. 
 
1.1. The present study 
 
The goal of the present study was to test the hypothesis that humans have enhanced 
cognitive access to normative information, specifically that individuals have better recall of 
normative than non-normative information. To examine the hypothesis, we conducted three 
experiments in which participants were asked to read through a text and were then tested on 
their recollection of diverse social information in the text, which differed in whether it was 
normative or not. Across these experiments, we varied how we tested recall, with the 
assessment of participants taking the form of multiple-choice responses in Experiment 1 
and cued-recall responses in Experiments 2 and 3. In addition, in Experiment 3 we 
examined whether perceived importance of normative information affected recall success. 
 
The text that we used was an aggregated set of passages derived from an 
ethnographic account of the people living on the Polynesian island of Tikopia (Firth, 1936). 
This was chosen because it was presumably unfamiliar to the participants due to its content 
being highly distal from their own cultural knowledge, thus reducing the likelihood of 
participants extrapolating their own norms to interpret specific behaviors of individuals 
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recounted in the text. If the material had been based on Western cultural norms, participants 
would have been aware of normative behaviors, even if no normative information were 
presented. Thus, it was critical to present unfamiliar social information. 
 
Using text as the stimulus-medium  may seem evolutionarily incongruous means of 
presenting social information, but given that reading is a successful medium for evoking 
imagery and experiences in humans (Gottschall & Wilson, 2005), as exemplified by the 
popularity of novels, it was considered a more tractable and pragmatic procedure than 
alternatives such as creating a complex social environment in which to immerse 
participants. Furthermore, Nairne, Thompson, and Pandeirada (2007) have shown that even 
recall of specific words can be affected by the fitness-relevance of those words, 
demonstrating that text-based stimuli can be valid for testing evolutionary hypotheses. 
 
We also examined whether there is a sex difference in recall performance of 
normative information. Research generally shows that females have a greater aptitude for, 
and display a greater orientation toward, social affairs (Geary, 1998). However, we did not 
expect a sex difference for the processing of novel social norms. Both males and females 
should be equally vigilant in attending to social norms because ignorance of norms is likely 
to have had similar effects on the fitness of males and females in the Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptedness (Bowlby, 1969; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Even though males 
might seem more likely to cognitively attend to outgroup norms due to their more 
immediate involvement in group conflicts (and perhaps other-group contacts), females in 
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hunter-gatherer societies often move to a new group when they reach marriageable age 
(Geary, 1998), which suggests a need for females to also have an ability to attend to novel 
social norms. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
 
2.1. Method 
 
2.1.1. Participants. The participants were 139 undergraduates (30 males, 109 
females; ages between 17 and 34, with a mean of 18.6) from an introductory Psychology 
course at SUNY-Binghamton (USA) who participated for course credit. Each experimental 
session consisted of no more than 14 students and lasted for a maximum duration of one 
hour. 
 
2.1.2. Materials. The text contained 48 paragraphs, of which 30 were salient to the 
experiment and contained social information about various aspects of Tikopian life. We 
augmented the initial text extracts from Firth (1936) with additional text passages modeled 
on the original samples. Each passage of the text detailed some event involving a member 
of the Tikopian community. Two versions of the text were generated (see online 
supplementary material). In each version, 15 of the experimentally salient paragraphs had 
an explicitly normative dimension and 15 paragraphs did not. 
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Although the concept of social norms remains theoretically ill-defined (Hechter & 
Opp, 2001; Shaffer, 1983), we adopted Cialdini & Trost’s (1998) definition of a social 
norm as one that is broadly encompassing: a social norm is a rule or social standard that is 
understood by members of a group. We created the normative versions of salient 
paragraphs by modifying a few words or a short clause within those paragraphs to state that 
the focal behavior in the paragraph was “taboo”, “traditional”, “practiced by everyone,” or 
a “custom”, terms whose meaning is strongly related to social norms. The use of a set of 
terms was to avoid creating a readily detectable pattern in the manipulation. In the non-
normative versions, the clauses stated that the behavior was a one-off for that individual or 
was in some way unique to the occasion. 
 
The following are examples of the normative and non-normative versions of an 
experimentally salient paragraph (the manipulated text is italicized—this formatting did not 
appear in the actual text): 
 
Normative version: One day, when an argument became sufficiently disruptive to 
those around them, one of the participants went to the chief to resolve the 
difference. When I asked why he went to the chief, he told me that an unresolvable 
argument must be taken to the Ariki, as is dictated by custom. 
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Non-normative version: One day, when an argument became sufficiently disruptive 
to those around them, one of the participants went to the chief to resolve the 
difference. When I asked why he went to the chief, he told me that it seemed to be a 
way to resolve the difference. 
 
The two versions were counterbalanced such that each paragraph was presented to 
approximately half the participants in a normative form and to half in a non-normative 
form. Normative and non-normative paragraphs were alternated. There was no significant 
difference in the number of words in the salient paragraphs between versions (paired t-test: 
t(29) = 0.41, p > 0.10) or between conditions within each version (independent t-tests, 
equal variances: tversion1(28) = 1.31, p > 0.10; tversion2(28) = -0.53, p > 0.10).  
 
A question was derived for each experimentally salient passage in the text, based on 
the actions of an individual in that passage, such that the questions were equally applicable 
to the normative and non-normative versions of a paragraph by simply querying what the 
individual did (see online supplementary material). Multiple-choice options were developed 
that varied from the correct option using distracter information that was presented 
elsewhere in the text. For example, the preceding samples of the text were tested with the 
following question: “How was the argument, which the author witnessed, resolved?” The 
multiple-choice options for Experiment 1 were (a) the author went to the chief to ask him to 
resolve the difference, (b) one of the witnesses went to the chief to ask him to resolve the 
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difference, (c) the chief heard the argument and came to resolve the difference, and (d) one 
of the participants went to the chief to resolve the difference. 
 
2.1.3. Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned one of the two versions of 
the experimental text. They were presented with the following instructions: 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the ability of people of one culture to 
comprehend another culture. You are required to read carefully and thoroughly 
through the text that you have received. The text consists of excerpts detailing 
aspects of a non-Western culture. The text is taken from a book called “We, the 
Tikopia,” written by Raymond Firth in 1936. It is a study of the culture of the 
people living on the island of Tikopia. 
 
You should read through the text without preconceptions regarding what to 
remember or attempting to memorize or focus on any particular aspect. Just read 
through the text steadily and only once. 
 
In addition, the instructions outlined the maximum time available for the 
experiment, the sequence of procedural steps involved (reading and signing the consent 
sheet, reading the text, and answering the questions), and noted that participants would be 
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tested on the material. They were then permitted to read through the experimental text, 
which began: 
 
Imagine that you are an anthropologist and you will soon be visiting Tikopia to 
study the Tikopian way of life, and everything about the people and how they live. 
The following account is the only source of information for you about Tikopia. This 
is your one and only opportunity to correctly observe the place and the people, so it 
is important to be well prepared. 
 
Upon completion of the text, participants were presented with 30 multiple-choice 
questions relating to the experimental paragraphs, with four candidate answers per 
question. Once the participants completed the questions, they were fully debriefed 
regarding the study, and were given the appropriate course credit. 
 
2.2. Results 
 
The responses were coded for correct answers. Overall, participants obtained 
between 10 and 30 correct answers (30 was the maximum possible correct score, obtained 
by only one participant, while 10 other participants obtained the maximum 15 norm items 
correct while 2 other participants achieved the maximum 15 correct for non-norm items), 
with a mean score of 22.3 (the standard deviation was 4.5). 
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Counterbalancing of the two text versions was achieved by having paragraphs 
related to even-numbered questions normative for one version and paragraphs related to 
odd-numbered questions normative for the other version. The data were analyzed using a 
repeated-measures ANOVA, with the experimental treatment (normative vs. non-
normative) as one factor and sex of participant and counterbalanced version examined as 
second and third factors. There was an effect for the norm/non-norm treatment [F(1,135) = 
6.43, p =.012; see Figure 1 for means and standard errors], with social information more 
accurately recognized when normative, but there was no significant effect of sex or version 
(p’s >.27), nor were there any significant interaction effects (p’s >.23). The effect size (η2) 
for the norm/non-norm manipulations was 0.045 (equivalent to Cohen’s d =.43, a small to 
medium effect by convention). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3. Experiment 2 
 
Studies such as Cosmides and Tooby (1992) and Silverman and Eals (1992) provide 
evidence for domain-specificity in human cognition, relating to reasoning and spatial 
memory, respectively. In both cases, performance was relatively better when the 
experimental task more closely fit with an ecologically valid form of the task. Similarly, we 
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expected to see relatively better performance by participants when the method of recalling 
the information is more natural. To test this, we modified the response method for 
Experiment 2 from multiple-choice to cued-recall. This change was intended to make the 
task more similar to the real-world situation of needing to recollect the appropriate norm 
without the advantage of being able to choose the right option by recognition. Because the 
change in experimental procedure was also likely to make the task more difficult, the 
predicted superior performance for normative information should have been evidenced 
statistically as a stronger norm-manipulation effect size rather than actual raw score 
improvements. 
 
3.1. Method 
 
3.1.1. Participants. The participants were 156 undergraduates (30 males, 113 
females, 13 not identified) from an introductory psychology course at SUNY-Binghamton 
(USA) who participated for course credit. Each experimental session consisted of no more 
than 10 participants and lasted for a maximum duration of one hour. 
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3.1.2. Materials. The materials used in this study were the same as those used in 
Experiment 1. 
 
3.1.3. Procedure. The procedure was the same as for Experiment 1, with one 
exception: Instead of using a multiple-choice test to assess recollection of the text material, 
the study used a cued-recall answer format, in which participants wrote whatever they 
considered to be the correct answer for each question (see online supplementary material). 
The questions were essentially the same as used for Experiment 1, with minor 
modifications made to ten questions to accommodate the difference in format for multiple-
choice and cued-recall questions. 
 
3.2. Results 
 
Two judges carried out condition-blind coding of the answers. The inter-rater 
reliability of summed (total) participant scores was r =.963 with 89.3% of individual 
answers were coded the same by both judges, demonstrating high similarity in coding. 
However, to be conservative, only answers coded by both judges as being correct were so 
considered. 
 
The modification of the study to a cued-recall test had the effect of reducing overall 
recall performance and increasing the variance slightly. Participants obtained between 1 
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and 26 correct answers (there was no ceiling effect in any condition), with a mean score of 
15.2 and a standard deviation of 5.4. The data were analyzed as per Experiment 1. The 
norm/non-norm manipulation had an effect (F(1, 139) = 25.67, p <.001, η2 =.156 
[equivalent to Cohen’s d =.86, a large effect]; see Figure 2 for means and standard errors). 
There was an interaction between the norm/non-norm manipulation and the 
counterbalancing (F(1, 139) = 4.35, p =.039), the result of the mean number of correct even 
answers being 0.51 greater than the odd answers (main effect, F(1,139) = 6.28, p =.013). 
However, there was no effect of sex (p >.80) nor any interactions between sex and the other 
two factors (p’s >.18). Again, social information appeared to be more successfully recalled 
when it was normative, and the effect size was substantially larger for cued-recall than 
multiple-choice recognition. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. Experiment 3 
 
We chose to modify the instructions for Experiment 3 in order to eliminate any 
apparent priming of social normative elements in the task. Statements in the task 
instructions such as “the purpose of this study is to examine the ability of people of one 
culture to comprehend another culture” and the opening introductory paragraph in the text, 
which began by suggesting that the reader is an anthropologist studying another culture, 
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were removed. The second and third paragraphs of the text were slightly modified (see 
online supplementary material). This was done to reduce the possibility that task demands 
were producing the experimental effect rather than the hypothesized cognitive normative 
bias. In addition, Experiment 3 was conducted in the UK, offering a cross-cultural contrast 
with Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
We also examined whether there is a relationship between recall performance and 
perceived importance of the experimentally salient stimuli. This was to examine whether 
the previous results were due not to a cognitive bias for norms but rather because 
information that was normative was perceived by participants as relatively important. Of 
course, this should also be the case if our hypothesized cognitive bias is correct. The 
difference is that if information in the previous studies is being encoded solely on the basis 
of importance, then we should also find a relationship between the level of successful recall 
of normative information and rated importance of each norm, thus controlling for the 
norm/non-norm manipulation. In contrast, we would expect no such relationship for a 
cognitive bias for unfamiliar normative information. In the absence of social cues or 
experience to inform participants about the importance of each norm, we expected that the 
specific content of the normative information would matter less than the status of it being 
normative. 
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4.1. Method 
 
4.1.1. Participants. The participants were undergraduates from introductory 
psychology courses at the University of Essex (UK) and the University of Kent (UK) who 
participated for course credit. 95 participants (22 males, 73 females) completed the recall 
task while 20 participants (3 males, 17 females) rated the normative information for 
perceived importance. Each experimental recall task session consisted of no more than 10 
participants and lasted for a maximum duration of one hour while each rating session 
consisted of no more than 6 participants and lasted for a maximum duration of half an hour. 
 
4.1.2. Materials. The materials used in the recall task component of the experiment 
were the same as those used in Experiment 2, except that the text was modified as already 
described, and the instructions were modified to eliminate references to culture or groups, 
focusing instead on individual behavior: 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine reading comprehension. You are required to 
read carefully and thoroughly through the text that you have received. The text 
consists of excerpts detailing the behaviour of a number of individuals from the 
Pacific Islands. 
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The text used to evaluate the perceived importance of the norms in the material 
consisted only of the 30 experimentally salient paragraphs (see online supplementary 
material). Participants were presented with instructions designed to encourage them to 
avoid rating all norms as equally important simply by virtue of being a norm, but rather to 
evaluate the importance of each norm based on its content. Instructions also provided basic 
information about the island of Tikopia. 
 
4.1.3. Procedure. The procedure for the recall component was the same as for 
Experiment 2. For the rating component, participants were requested to read the text, which 
instructed them to judge each norm on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 labeled as “not at all 
important,” 4 as “moderately important,” and 7 as “very important”. 
 
4.2. Results 
 
Two judges carried out condition-blind coding of the answers. The inter-rater 
reliability of summed (total) participant scores was r =.96 with 92.2% of individual answers 
were coded the same by both judges, demonstrating high similarity in coding. However, to 
be conservative, we again considered answers to be correct only if they were coded as such 
by both judges. 
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Participants obtained between 1 and 28 correct answers, with a mean score of 17.5 
and a standard deviation of 5.6. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the data were analyzed using a 
repeated measures ANOVA, with the norm/non-norm manipulation as the repeated 
measure, and with the sex of the participants and counterbalanced version of the text as the 
independent factors. The norm/non-norm manipulation had an effect (F(1, 91) = 11.29, p < 
0.001, η2 =.110 [equivalent to Cohen’s d =.70, a medium to large effect] ; see Figure 3 for 
means and standard errors). There were no other main effects (p’s >.60) nor were there any 
significant interactions (p’s >.29). Once again, social information appeared to be more 
successfully recalled when it was normative. The effect size was reduced somewhat from 
Experiment 2, though whether this is attributable to either the cultural change in 
participants (British vs. American) or the modification of instructions is uncertain. 
Nonetheless, the effect size remained substantial. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Ratings of the importance of individual norms ranged from 3.0 to 5.5. Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient for the ratings was 0.94, a very high level of agreement between 
participants per item. The correlation between the level of successful recall per item across 
participants (i.e., using data obtained only when the items were framed to participants as 
norms) and average rated importance was r =.13 (p =.26), indicative, at most, of a weak 
relationship with recall of the information. 
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5. Discussion 
 
The results of the three experiments consistently support the hypothesis that 
individuals recall normative social information better than non-normative social 
information, supporting the notion of a cognitive bias in human cognition for social norms. 
The results also provide a limited cross-cultural endorsement of the hypothesized bias. In 
addition, in line with our expectations for the hypothesized cognitive mechanism, the 
perceived importance of the social norms did not appreciably relate to the recall success of 
normative items. The lack of a significant relationship between perceived importance of 
norms and actual recall rate further supports the predictions derived from an adaptationist 
framework as opposed to a more domain-general approach. 
 
A fruitful avenue to pursue may lie with determining the specific proximate 
psychological mechanisms that generate the apparent cognitive bias for social norms. Many 
evolutionary psychological approaches argue for direct mechanisms as design solutions 
(e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Ellis et al., 2003) and it may be that humans have an 
evolved capacity for enhanced retention and accessibility of social norm information to 
facilitate adoption of, compliance with, and avoidance of violations of social norms. 
Cummins (1998) suggests that children as young as three years of age can reason 
successfully about social norms (“deontic reasoning”). The recall bias found in the present 
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study could be due to evolved systematic biases in attention, memory or other aspects of 
knowledge-acquisition. 
 
Alternatively, learned contingencies facilitated by underlying evolved sensitivities 
may provide motivational and affective influence on cognition and so generate a cognitive 
bias. Garcia and colleagues (Garcia & Ervine, 1968; Garcia, Ervine, & Koelling, 1966) 
demonstrated this with laboratory rats, showing that they are predisposed to express certain 
environmental contingencies more readily than others. In particular, if punitive responses 
are critical in developing a cognitive bias, then an evolved sensitivity to standard punitive 
responses to norm violations, such as ostracism and negative social discourse (gossip), 
could result in appropriate psychological encoding. In particular, childhood experiences, 
when violations are unlikely to be very costly (though individuals ostracized as children 
might beg to differ), may establish an encoding bias. Of course, this bias could also result 
from general learning that the punitive consequences of violating social norms are negative, 
but individuals who are more sensitive to punishment would acquire norms faster and incur 
fewer social costs. On the other hand, if the cognitive bias is primarily due to a motive to 
adopt beneficial behaviors, punishment sensitivity for norm violations would not be 
expected, while a membership-related mechanism should result in conformism whenever 
an individual identifies a target group. Indeed, this may represent a means to discriminate 
between the various theoretical models. 
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As we noted in the introduction, there are several plausible theoretical explanations 
for social norms (and hence the conformity bias evidenced herein) and this study was not 
designed to distinguish among them. Nonetheless, some further distinctions can be 
predicted between the various theoretical frameworks which relate to variations in 
perceived value of familiar norms (Mudd, 1968, 1972) and possible individual differences 
in norm-compliance strategies (Wilson, 1994, 1998). The present study suggests that 
perceived value may not be necessarily a factor for unfamiliar norms, but we would not 
make a similar prediction for familiar norms. Quite the contrary; for norms that are the 
product of a cooperative process, evading or minimizing compliance could be an adaptive 
strategy for some individuals. Indeed, individuals should strive to undermine norms that are 
contrary to their fitness interests. Such behavior would not occur if norms are primarily the 
result of a conformist learning or coordination mechanism, although it could be predicted 
from the membership account of norms, if an individual were to be at a disadvantage to 
signal membership. However, membership norms should not necessarily be difficult for 
group members but simply obscure to those unfamiliar with the group. 
 
Individual differences in compliance to social norms would be predicted in the case 
of the morality and cooperative norm account due to likely equilibria for behavioral niches 
related to personality traits such as cooperativeness and Machiavellianism. This variation in 
strategies could occur because in social environments there is often no superior strategy 
(Hirshleifer & Martinez Coll, 1988). For example, it has been shown that individuals vary 
in their willingness to punish violators of social norms (O’Gorman, Wilson, & Miller, 
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2005; Wilson & O’Gorman, 2003). Costly norms that can be exploited should result in a 
diversity of strategies. 
 
Realistically, all the explanations may contribute to the normative process. 
Empirically determining which processes, if any, are the primary causes of norms seems 
challenging, particularly as there is strong overlap in what they predict (as in the case of 
this study). Most likely, each process contributes differentially to the range of norms that 
exist in any society, and thus the best approach may be to examine norms on a case-by-case 
basis for the relevant generative process or processes. 
 
In conclusion, social norms represent a facet of human culture that is often used to 
explain uniformity in human behavior, often to counter evolutionary explanations. 
However, culture in humans is very likely to have been driven by selective pressure 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005) and social norms represent an adaptive component. Our 
expectation is that while there is some hardwiring in the human brain for social norms, 
there is also a powerful capacity for diversity of content—the specifics of norms. This is a 
view that is increasingly being supported by neuropsychological data (for discussions, see 
Damasio, 1994; Deacon, 1997) and is in line with the gene-culture model put forward by 
Richerson and Boyd (2005). The present study demonstrates that humans have a recall bias 
for normative social information and supports the use of evolutionary theory to develop 
hypotheses regarding human social influence on behavior. This approach opens up a 
number of new research questions that impact on areas of human behavior that have been 
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extensively studied within traditional psychology but which could benefit from an 
evolutionary perspective. 
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1: The total number of test items successfully recalled for Experiment 1, with 
standard error bars, broken down by condition and by sex. 
 
Figure 2: The total number of test items successfully recalled for Experiment 2, with 
standard error bars, broken down by condition and by sex. 
 
Figure 3: The total number of test items successfully recalled for Experiment 3, with 
standard error bars, broken down by condition and by sex. 
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